CPLR 203(b): Preservation of a Medical Malpractice Cause of Action Under CPLR 203(b) by Ragusa, Louis J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 56 
Number 2 Volume 56, Winter 1982, Number 2 Article 4 
July 2012 
CPLR 203(b): Preservation of a Medical Malpractice Cause of 
Action Under CPLR 203(b) 
Louis J. Ragusa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ragusa, Louis J. (1982) "CPLR 203(b): Preservation of a Medical Malpractice Cause of Action Under CPLR 
203(b)," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 56 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol56/iss2/4 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
1982] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Survey is Connell v. Hayden, a case in which the second depart-
ment considered the unity-of-interest principle embodied in CPLR
203(b). The Connell court held that because a professional corpo-
ration is united in interest with its members, service upon the cor-
poration will relate back to the date of service upon an individual
member. Significantly, however, the court expressly declined to re-
solve the question whether the continuous treatment doctrine can
apply in the context of such corporations so as to postpone accrual
of a medical malpractice cause of action.
It is hoped that the cases treated in this installment of The
Survey will keep the bar aware of the important developments in
New York law.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Article 2-Limitations of Time
CPLR 203(b): Preservation of a medical malpractice cause of ac-
tion under CPLR 203(b)
In New York, a medical malpractice cause of action is deemed
to accrue at the time of an alleged act of malpractice,1 irrespective
of the plaintiff's knowledge of such negligent act.2 Nevertheless,
pursuant to the continuous treatment doctrine, the accrual date
for statute of limitations purposes may be postponed until the ter-
mination of medical services.' Of course, regardless of when the
I E.g., Davis v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 257, 259, 342 N.E.2d 516, 517, 379
N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (1975); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 217,
188 N.E.2d 142, 144, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717-18, modified, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 1073, 190 N.E.2d
142, 144, 239 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Brush v. Olivo, 81 App.
Div. 2d 852, 853, 438 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (2d Dep't 1981); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div.
227, 229, 241 N.Y.S. 529, 532 (1st Dep't), afl'd, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930). But see
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301 N.Y.S.2d
23, 27 (1969); CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (when a foreign object negligently
has been left in a plaintiff-patient's body, the statute of limitations for a medical malprac-
tice action will not commence until the plaintiff has discovered or reasonably should have
discovered such object).
2 Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 217, 188 N.E.2d 142, 144-
45, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717-18, modified, 12 N.Y.2d 1073, 1073, 190 N.E.2d 253, 253, 239
N.Y.S.2d 896, 897, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Dis-
eases, 36 App. Div. 2d 31, 33, 319 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (2d Dep't 1971); SIEGEL § 42, at 44.
3 E.g., Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155-56, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778-79, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22 (1962); Muller v. Sturman, 79 App. Div. 2d 482, 484, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205,
207 (4th Dep't 1981); Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 543-44, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845
(3d Dep't 1975); CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) (codification of the continuous
treatment doctrine). Borgia, the case which promulgated the continuous treatment doctrine,
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malpractice cause of action is deemed to accrue, it will be time-
barred unless interposed within the applicable statutory period.4
CPLR 203(b), however, will toll such statute of lHmitations5 as to a
defendant who is "united in interest" with another timely served
defendant.6 Recently, in Connell v. Hayden,7 the Appellate Divi-
defined continuous treatment as "treatment for the same or related illness or injuries, con-
tinuing after the alleged acts of malpractice, not mere continuity of a general physician-
patient relationship." 12 N.Y.2d at 157, 187 N.E.2d at 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 322. Continuous
treatment is sufficient to extend the statute of limitations even when no further negligence
occurs in the course of such continuous treatment. See id.; Brush v. Olivo, 81 App. Div. 2d
852, 853, 438 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (2d Dep't 1981); O'Laughlin v. Salamanca Hosp. Dist. Auth.,
36 App. Div. 2d 51, 53-54, 319 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130-31 (4th Dep't 1971). Furthermore, courts
have extended the continuous treatment doctrine to include other professionals. See Siegel
v. Kranis, 29 App. Div. 2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (2d Dep't 1968) (attorney);
County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 892-93, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1003
(Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974) (architect); 1 WK&M 214.22a, at 2-311.
4 Until the adoption of CPLR 214-a, actions for medical malpractice were governed by
CPLR 214, which provided for a 3-year statute of limitations. CPLR 214(6) (1972). CPLR
214-a, which is applicable to any act of malpractice accruing on or after July 1, 1975, pro-
vides that the action must be commenced within 2 years and 6 months of the alleged act of
malpractice. CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
5 CPLR 203(b) (1972). The effect of the CPLR provision is such that timely interposi-
tion of a claim against any codefendant permanently deprives all other codefendants who
are "united in interest" of the statute of limitations defense. Morrison v. Foster, 80 App.
Div. 2d 887, 888, 437 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (2d Dep't 1981); Zeitler v. City of Rochester, 32
App. Div. 2d 728, 728, 302 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (4th Dep't 1969); Gross v. Newburger, Loeb &
Co., 103 Misc. 2d 417, 425, 426 N.Y.S.2d 667, 674 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980); Modica v.
Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 1086, 1087, 283 N.Y.S.2d 939, 940
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1967); 1 WK&M 1 203.05, at 2-67. Notably, the statute of
limitations will not be tolled as to a defendant who was not served within the time limita-
tion period and who was not named as a party defendant in the summons which was served
upon the timely served codefendant. Shaw v. Cock, 78 N.Y. 194, 199 (1879); Miller v. Farina,
58 App. Div. 2d 731, 732, 395 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (4th Dep't 1977); McCabe v. Queensboro
Farm Prods., Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 553, 553, 223 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11
N.Y.2d 963, 183 N.E.2d 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1962); Halucha v. Jockey Club, 31 Misc. 2d
186, 189, 220 N.Y.S.2d 567, 571 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1961). But see Brock v. Bua, 83 App.
Div. 2d 61, 67-68, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (2d Dep't 1981) (requirement that a late-served
defendant must be named as a party defendant in the timely interposed summons is obso-
lete and inordinately formalistic); note 19 infra.
6 CPLR 203(b) (1972). The classic definition of "united in interest" was advanced by
the Court of Appeals in Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stone, 270 N.Y. 154, 200 N.E. 679
(1936), wherein the Court stated, "[i]f the interest of the parties in the subject-matter is
such that they stand or fall together and that judgment against one will similarly affect the
other then they are 'otherwise united in interest.'" Id. at 159, 200 N.E. at 681; see, e.g.,
Scher v. Kronman, 70 App. Div. 2d 354, 356, 420 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715 (1st Dep't 1979); Gross
v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 103 Misc. 2d 417, 425-26, 426 N.Y.S.2d 667, 674 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1980). The Prudential Court further stated that "the interests of the defendants in
preventing the plaintiff from obtaining the relief sought [must be] so inseparably inter-
twined that the presumption is warranted that they will both be desirous of reaching the
same result." 270 N.Y. at 161, 200 N.E. at 681. This formulation, while attempting to pro-
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sion, Second Department, upon holding that service on one defen-
dant cannot give a court in personam jurisdiction over another de-
fendant,8 noted two statute of limitations issues in dicta. The
Connell court expressly reserved decision on whether continuous
treatment of the same plaintiff-patient by different defendant-
physicians postpones accrual of a medical malpractice cause of ac-
tion,9 but upon thoroughly discussing CPLR 203(b), 10 stated that a
professional service corporation is sufficiently united in interest
with its physician-employees to permit the tolling of the statute of
limitations as to such corporation.1'
In Connell, the plaintiffs attempted to commence a medical
malpractice action against Drs. Hayden and Jonassen individually,
and against the professional service corporation which employed
them, by timely serving Dr. Hayden."2 In opposing Dr. Jonassen's
vide the criterion for assessing unity of interest, has proved to be nebulous. See 1 WK&M 1
203.06, at 2-68. Certain generalizations, however, have emerged. First, to be united in inter-
est, it is not necessary that the parties be joint contractors or have a joint interest. E.g., 270
N.Y. at 159, 200 N.E. at 680; Trane Co. v. N. Robinson Constr., Inc., 61 App. Div. 2d 360,
364, 402 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456 (3d Dep't 1978). Second, the mere fact that the defendants are
coemployees or joint tortfeasors does not imply that they are united in interest. See Scher v.
Kronman, 70 App. Div. 2d 354, 356, 420 N.Y.S.2d 714, 715 (1st Dep't 1979); Marchetti v.
Linn, 197 Misc. 658, 660, 99 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1950). Third, when
one party is vicariously liable for another, the two parties are considered to be united in
interest. E.g., Hatch v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 274 App. Div. 234, 241, 82 N.Y.S.2d 322, 328
(4th Dep't 1948); Diver v. Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn, 18 Misc. 2d 231, 233, 188 N.Y.S.2d
1003, 1005 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959); Pandolfo v. Ansbro, 10 Misc. 2d 51, 52, 174
N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958). Finally, when one party may have a de-
fense which is not available to the other party, they will not be in unity of interest. See
Stevens v. Young, 272 App. Div. 784, 785, 69 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637-38 (2d Dep't 1947); Gross v.
Newburger, Loeb & Co., 103 Misc. 2d 417, 425-26, 426 N.Y.S.2d 667, 675 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1980); Halucha v. Jockey Club, 31 Misc. 2d 186, 189, 220 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. County 1961).
83 App. Div. 2d 30, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383 (2d Dep't 1981).
8 Id. at 35, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
9 Id. at 39, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 391. Interestingly, in Paciello v. Patel, 83 App. Div. 2d 73,
443 N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dep't 1981), Presiding Justice Damiani had an opportunity to address
whether claim accrual against multiple physicians, who work for the same professional ser-
vice corporation may be postponed under the continuous treatment doctrine. Id. at 75, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 405. As he did in Connell, however, Presiding Justice Damiani reserved ruling
on the issue. Id. Due to the difficulty that courts have been experiencing with the continu-
ous treatment exception to the medical malpractice statute of limitations, see CPLR 214-a,
commentary at 148 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982), it is understandable that the Paciello and
Connell courts were reluctant to address the issue.
10 83 App. Div. 2d at 40-45, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 392-94.
1' Id. at 49, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
, Id. at 32, 35, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 387, 389. The summons and complaint merely named
the doctors individually as defendants and did not allege that they practiced either as a
professional service corporation or as a partnership. Id. Additionally, the plaintiffs at-
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ensuant motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs claimed that
Drs. Hayden and Jonassen practiced medicine as a partnership."3
Stressing that Dr. Hayden was timely served, the plaintiffs as-
serted that such service also was timely as to the partnership and
as to Dr. Hayden's partner, Dr. Jonassen.1' Although the doctors
proved that they practiced medicine as a professional service cor-
poration, and not as a partnership, 5 the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, denied Dr. Jonassen's motion for summary judgment,
holding that because the defendants were "united in interest,"
timely service upon Dr. Hayden tolled the statute of limitations as
to the defendant Dr. Jonassen and the defendant professional ser-
vice corporation. 8
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, re-
versed.17 Writing for a unanimous court,18 Presiding Justice Dami-
ani held that since neither the corporation nor Dr. Jonassen had
been served properly, the court lacked jurisdiction over these par-
ties.19 Although noting that the court did not have to address such
tempted to effect service upon Dr. Jonassen by delivering his copy of the summons and
complaint to Dr. Hayden and by mailing an additional copy to Dr. Jonassen's principal
place of business. Id. at 34, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 388; see note 19 infra. Furthermore, while it was
conceded that the acts of malpractice by Dr. Jonassen were committed 5 years prior to the
commencement of the action, even though the effective statute of limitations was 3 years,
the plaintiff maintained that Dr. Hayden subsequently had continued treating the patient
within the 3-year statutory period. 83 App. Div. 2d at 38-39, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 390-91.
15 83 App. Div. 2d at 33, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 387.
14 Id.
"' Id., 443 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
16 Id.
1 Id. at 60, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
18 Presiding Justice Damiani authored an opinion in which Justices Cohalan, Laser and
Thompson concurred.
19 83 App. Div. 2d at 34-35, 37, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 388, 390. In effecting service upon Dr.
Jonassen, the plaintiffs had mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to Dr. Jonassen's
place of business, id. at 34, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 338, instead of his last known residence as is
required by CPLR 308(2) (1972 & McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). See Glikman v. Horowitz,
66 App. Div. 2d 814, 814, 411 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (2d Dep't 1978); Chalk v. Catholic Medical
Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 822, 823-24, 396 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (2d
Dep't 1977). Additionally, Presiding Justice Damiani concluded that the court could not
exercise jurisdiction over the professional service corporation because it was not named as a
party defendant. 83 App. Div. 2d at 37, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 390. Interestingly, in Brock v. Bau,
83 App. Div. 2d 61, 63, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407, 409 (2d Dep't 1981), decided on the same day as
Connell, Presiding Justice Damiani was presented with the issue of whether a claim asserted
against a new party in an amended pleading should relate back to the date upon which the
plaintiff's claim previously was interposed against the originally named defendant. Relying
on Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court stipulated a three-pronged
test to determine whether the amended pleading should relate back. Id. at 68-71, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 412-13. Pursuant to the test, relation back will occur when: (1) both claims arise
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statute of limitations issues as continuous treatment and unity of
interest,20 Presiding Justice Damiani discussed the latter issue-in
dicta.2 The court first noted that the mere possibility that one de-
fendant may have a defense which is not available to the other will
preclude a finding of unity of interest.2 Hence, reasoned the court,
only when one defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of the
other will their interests be united, since only then will the de-
fenses available to the defendants be identical.2" Notably, the court
further determined that the presence of a unity of interest is not
dependent upon whether the tortfeasor or the vicariously liable
party was timely served.2 4 The court concluded, therefore, that
since the relationship between an employee and his professional-
service-corporation employer confers vicarious liability upon the
employer, the employee and employer are united in interest.2 5
Conversely, the court also concluded that coemployees of a profes-
sional service corporation, because they are not vicariously liable
for each other's negligent acts, are not united in interest.26
out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence; (2) the new party is united in interest
with the original defendant; (3) the new party should have realized that but for an excusable
error by the plaintiff as to the identities of the proper parties, the action also would have
been brought against him. Id. Applying this test to the instant case, it appears that an
amendment of the original summons, naming the defendant professional service corporation
would relate back to the original complaint. See 83 App. Div. 2d at 37, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
But see note 32 and accompanying text infra (vicariously liable party who is not timely
served should not be deemed to be in unity of interest with timely served tortfeasor).
83 App. Div. 2d at 38, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
Id. at 38-59, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 390-402.
Id. at 41-42, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
23 Id. at 45, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 394. Presiding Justice Damiani undertook an examination
of the policy upon which statutes of limitations are based, namely, to relieve a defendant
from the necessity of investigation and preparing a defense for "stale" claims. Id. at 41, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 392; see 2 CARMODY & WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE § 13.1 (2d ed.
1965). Unity of interest serves as a valid exception to the statute of limitations, the court
concluded, since timely service upon one of the united defendants will still permit the inves-
tigation of all the defenses which are available to all the defendants within the period of
time limitation. 83 App. Div. 2d at 41, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 392. The court concluded, therefore,
that in an action for malpractice the defenses available to a defendant will be identical to
those available to another defendant only when the former is vicariously liable for the acts
of the latter. See id. at 45, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
24 83 App. Div. 2d at 48, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
25 Id. at 47-49, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 395-96; see Szajna v. Rand, 75 App. Div. 2d 617, 618,
427 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (2d Dep't 1980); Hatch v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 274 App. Div. 234, 241,
82 N.Y.S.2d 322, 328 (4th Dep't 1948); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70,
at 460 (4th ed. 1971).
6 83 App. Div. 2d at 59, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The court noted that coemployees would
be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of each other if they participated in a joint enter-
prise. Id. at 57, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 401. Presiding Justice Damiani explained, however, that a
1982]
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The Connell court's use of a vicarious liability test to deter-
mine whether a unity of interest exists between a professional ser-
vice corporation and one of its employees is a logical extension of
prior cases employing such a test to assess the presence or absence
of a unity of interest in other types of business organizations. 7
Nevertheless, it is suggested that such a test is remiss because it is
not grounded upon the requirement that no party have a unique
defense, a well-settled precondition to the employment of the
.unity of interest doctrine.28 Of course, the Connell court's finding
of a unity of interest upon a mere showing of vicarious liability is
consistent with the majority of cases construing section 203(b). 29 It
is submitted, however, that the majority has failed to address ade-
quately the fundamental strictures of the unity of interest doctrine
in fashioning such a vicarious liability test.30 Concededly, since the
joint enterprise is deemed to exist only if the acts of the coemployees were committed
outside the course of employment, such as in a private business venture. Id. (relying on
McCormack v. Nassau Elec. R.R., 18 App. Div. 333, 334, 46 N.Y.S. 230, 230-31 (2d Dep't
1897)).
217 See, e.g., Szajna v. Rand, 75 App. Div. 2d 617, 618, 427 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (2d Dep't
1980) ("as with any other corporation, professional corporations are liable for the actions of
their members or officers when acting in these capacities"); Modica v. Westchester Rockland
Newspapers, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 1086, 1087, 283 N.Y.S.2d 939, 940 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1967) (an employee-employer relationship results in the two parties being united in
interest); Diver v. Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn, 18 Misc. 2d 231, 233, 188 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959) (service on hospital "commenced the action" against its em-
ployee for malpractice); Pandolfo v. Ansbro, 10 Misc. 2d 51, 52, 174 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1958) (physicians who are named as defendants "individually and as co-
partners" are united in interest); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1505(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-
1982); note 6 supra.
28 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stone, 270 N.Y. 154, 159, 200 N.E. 679, 680
(1936) (the parties are united in interest if "the interest of the parties in the subject matter
is such that they stand or fall together"); Gross v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 103 Misc. 2d 417,
425, 426 N.Y.S.2d 667, 675 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) ("courts have held that unity of
interest does not exist where defenses available to one defendant are unavailable to an-
other"); Halucha v. Jockey Club, 31 Misc. 2d 186, 189, 220 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
County 1961) ("[tlhere can be no 'unity of interest' if one defendant has defenses unavaila-
ble to the other; nor can there be 'unity of interest' if the defendant that is served could be
determined to be liable without a like finding as to the other defendant" (citation omitted));
notes 5 & 6 supra.
29 E.g., Jordan v. Westhill Cent. School Dist., 42 App. Div. 2d 1043, 1043, 348 N.Y.S.2d
620, 621 (4th Dep't 1973); Zeitler v. City of Rochester, 32 App. Div. 2d 728, 728, 302
N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (4th Dep't 1969); Hatch v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 274 App. Div. 234, 241,
82 N.Y.S.2d 322, 328 (4th Dep't 1948); Pandolfo v. Ansbro, 10 Misc. 2d 51, 52, 174 N.Y.S.2d
764, 765 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958).
20 Generally, in determining that unity of interest exists where there is a vicarious lia-
bility relationship, courts have not examined the issue whether the vicariously liable party
may assert a unique defense unavailable to the tortfeasor. E.g., Zeitler v. City of Rochester,
32 App. Div. 2d 728, 728, 302 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (4th Dep't 1969); Plumitallo v. 1407 Broad-
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untimely served primarily liable employee cannot, in investigating
his defenses, be prejudiced by the timely served vicariously liable
corporation's unique defense, the courts' invocation of the unity of
interest doctrine against such employee may be proper.3 ' Never-
theless, application of the doctrine to an untimely served vicari-
ously liable corporation would be inappropriate since such corpora-
tion, possessed of a unique defense, may be prejudiced in asserting
that defense.3 2
Surely, circumstances may arise wherein a medical malpractice
way Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 1019, 1019, 111 N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (2d Dep't 1952); Modica
v. Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 1086, 1087, 283 N.Y.S.2d 939, 940
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1967). The Zeitler opinion is particularly illustrative of the
fact that courts have failed to undertake extended discussion regarding the rationale of the
unity of interest rule as applied to the vicarious liability test. Indeed, the Zeitler court,
without further explanation, simply concluded that "[t]he defendants are clearly 'united in
interest' by reason of the city's alleged vicarious liability based on an employer-employee
relationship." 32 App. Div. at 728, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (citation omitted).
31 Since the primarily liable party cannot assert any unique defenses, he will not be
deprived of the opportunity to investigate his defenses. See 83 App. Div. 2d at 47, 443
N.Y.S. at 395.
32 See Halucha v. Jockey Club, 31 Misc. 2d 186, 189, 220 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1961). In Halucha, the plaintiff timely commenced an action against the em-
ployee. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiff claimed that since a unity of interest exists between an
employee and his employer, the statute of limitations as to an employer should be tolled by
timely service upon his employee. Id. The court summarily rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion, succinctly stating, "[t]he plaintiff misinterprets and misapplies the [unity of interest]
statute." Id. Reasoning that there could be no unity of interest if one defendant has de-
fenses unavailable to the other or if the defendant that is served could be determined liable
without a similar finding as to the other defendant, the Halucha court concluded that
timely service upon the defendant would not be valid against a late-served employer since
such employer may assert defenses which would be unavailable to its employee. Id.
Notably, the underlying rationale of statutes of limitations also suggests that applica-
tion of the unity of interest doctrine to an untimely-served vicariously-liable corporation
would be prejudicial to such corporation. Indeed, statutes of limitations are enacted "to
afford protection to defendants against defending stale claims after a reasonable period of
time had elapsed during which a person of ordinary diligence would bring an action." Flana-
gan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23,
25 (1969). As posited by the Connell court:
the primary purpose of Statutes of Limitation is to relieve defendants of the ne-
cessity of investigating and preparing a defense where the action is commenced
against them after the expiration of the statutory period because the law presumes
that by that time "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared."
83 App. Div. 2d 30, 41, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 392 (2d Dep't 1981) (quoting Order of R.R. Teleg-
raphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); see American Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 730 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977). Thus, the late service of a summons upon a vicariously
liable party may deprive him of his ability to investigate additional defenses within the
statutory period, thereby undermining the entire rationale of the statute of limitations.
1982]
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claimant who timely interposed a cause of action against one doc-
tor employed by a professional service corporation may wish to toll
or postpone the running of the statute of limitations not as to the
corporation itself, but rather, as to other physicians employed by
such corporation. It is suggested that section 203(b), although of
limited applicability, may successfully be employed in such cir-
cumstances. Indeed, it appears that this section properly may be
used to toll the running of the statute of limitations as to a physi-
cian who is under the supervision of another physician who was
timely served. In support of such view, it is noted that section
1505(a) of the Business Corporation Law provides that an em-
ployee of a professional service corporation shall be personally lia-
ble for the negligent acts committed by persons under his direct
supervision. s It is submitted that this statute was intended to al-
ter, from coagent to principal, the traditional view of the status of
an employee-supervisor.3 4 Surely, given such status, a supervisor in
a professional service corporation is vicariously liable for the mis-
conduct of his immediate subordinates. Since the supervisor-
subordinate relationship is analogous to the employer-employee re-
lationship, it appears that CPLR 203(b) may be used to toll the
running of the statute of limitations as to a subordinate-employee
whose immediate supervisor was timely served.
3 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1505(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982) provides:
Each shareholder, employee or agent of a professional service corporation shall be
personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful act or
misconduct committed by him or by any person under his direct supervision and
control while rendering professional services on behalf of such corporation.
Id.
I 3 State Senator Gioffre, who sponsored section 1505 of the Business Corporation Law,
stated that:
As applied to professional service corporations, the bill would modify the general
rule that shareholders of a corporation do not have personal liability [in that] a
shareholder of a professional service corporation would be personally responsible
for any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct committed by any person under
his direct supervision and control, as well as for his own acts, while rendering
professional services on behalf of such corporation.
Memorandum of Sen. Gioffre, reprinted in [1970] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 130 (emphasis added);
see McDonald, Business Associations, 1970 Survey of New York Law, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
249, 252 (1970); Zahn, The New York Professional Corporation Law Statutory Require-
ments and Examination of Factors to Determine Whether or not to Incorporate, 42 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 408, 409 (1970); Note, Professional Incorporation: The New York View, 37 BROOK-*
LYN L. REV. 159, 167 (1970). Many other states also have professional service corporation
statutes similar to the New York statute. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621.07 (West 1977 & Supp.
1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 415-8 (Smith-Hurd 1970); see OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1785.04 (Baldwin 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2007 (1979).
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Generally, no unity of interest may be found between two phy-
sicians who are mere coemployees of a professional service corpora-
tion, for neither is vicariously liable for the misconduct of the
other. 5 Nevertheless, it is submitted that the continuous treat-
ment doctrine offers a fitting alternative in such event, serving to
postpone the accrual of a medical malpractice cause of action, and
hence the running of the statute of limitations, as to any of the
physicians employed by a professional service corporation. Un-
doubtedly, doctors working for the same professional service corpo-
ration will maintain common records on their patients. Moreover,
the manner of treatment of a patient by a physician within a pro-
fessional service corporation probably will be determined by a co-
physician's prior diagnosis and treatment. Additionally, because a
patient's trust in one physician would tend to influence his deci-
sion to be treated by an associate of such physician,38 it would ap-
35 Cf. G. RAY, INCORPORATING THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 24-25 (2d ed. 1978) (when
one of the shareholders of a professional service corporation commits malpractice, this will
not involve his fellow shareholders, except to the extent of their interest in the corporate
assets); S. RIEMER, SERVICING THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION: A COMPLETE MANUAL AND
GUIDE 2-3 (1976) (the professional in a professional service corporation is not personally
liable for the acts committed by other professionals in the corporation); Rotgin, The Profes-
sional Corporation for Lawyers, 52 N.Y. St. B.J. 634, 634-35 (1980) (under New York law
the shareholder of a professional corporation is not personally liable for the malpractice of
other shareholders, unless he is also involved).
11 See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (ap-
plying New York law); County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 891,
358 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1001 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974). In Vincent J. Smith, Inc., the court
stressed the inherent fairness of the continuous treatment doctrine in the context of the
doctor-patient relationship. The court eloquently posited, "[t]his relationship is basically
one of trust and confidence and in most cases the patient has little or no knowledge of
medicine. He, therefore, must depend exclusively on his physician and must have absolute
trust in his judgment." 78 Misc. 2d at 891, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1001; see Mortensen v. United
States, 509 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. Greene v. Greene, 80 App. Div. 2d 55, 58, 437
N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (1st Dep't 1981) (so long as relationship of trust and confidence exists
between attorney and client, client could not be expected to bring action against attorney).
The Holdridge court, employing the same rationale as espoused in Vincent J. Smith, Inc.,
drastically extended the continuous treatment doctrine to cover manufacturers of medical
devices, holding that the continuous treatment by an attendant physician should be im-
puted to the manufacturer of medical devices where such devices were used as an integral
part of the continuous treatment. 440 F. Supp. at 1099. The rationale of the Holdridge court
was that a patient invariably relies upon his physician's judgment in the use of medical
devices and medications, thus he could not be expected to bring an action against the manu-
facturer of such products until the physician's treatment had terminated. Id. Although there
was no legal relationship between the parties, the court thought it appropriate to impute the
continuous treatment of the physician to the manufacturer to toll the statute of limitations.
Id. It is submitted that where the closeness of the relationship among physicians in a profes-
sional service corporation is evident, see Weiner v. Weiner, 88 Misc. 2d 920, 924, 390
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pear illogical not to find a continuity of treatment between two
treating physicians. s Therefore, it is submitted that the accrual of
a medical malpractice cause of action against any of a succession of
treating doctors, all of whom are employed by the same medical
professional service corporation, should not be deemed to occur
until the cessation of the plaintiff-patient's treatment.
Louis J. Ragusa
Article 30-Remedies and Pleading
CPLR 3017: Postverdict motion to amend ad damnum clause
should be granted in the absence of prejudice to defendant
CPLR 3017(a) empowers a court to grant any form of relief
that is appropriate to the proof, irrespective of whether the relief
to be granted was sought by the plaintiff. 8 Despite the broad
language of this provision, the courts repeatedly have declined to
exercise their authority to award money damages in excess of the
amount requested in the plaintiff's reliefs9 or "ad damnum"
clause.40 While the courts have granted preverdict motions to
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976), imputation from one doctor to another is
more appropriate. Otherwise, a physician aware of his negligence might pursue futile correc-
tive action or refer his patient to a fellow physician of the professional service corporation in
order to circumvent the statute of limitations. See County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith,
Inc., 78 Misc. 2d at 891, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
37 Notably, the underlying rationale of the continuous treatment doctrine, as promul-
gated in Borgia, is that "[i]t would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt
corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or hospital superintendent." Bor-
gia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22
(1962); see Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 App. Div. 2d 540, 544, 363 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (3d Dep't 1975); 1
WK&M 214-a.03, at 2-319.
38 CPLR 3017(a) provides in part that "[e]xcept as provided in section 3215, the court
may grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the proof whether or not
demanded, imposing such terms as may be just." CPLR 3017(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-
1981). CPLR 3017(a) requires the pleader to set forth the relief which he seeks. It does not
require the pleader to state the exact amount of damages sought, although this has become
standard practice. See Silvestris v. Silvestris, 24 App. Div. 2d 247, 250, 265 N.Y.S.2d 173,
178 (1st Dep't 1965); CPLR 3017(a), commentary at 11 (1974).
39 The claim for money damages contained in a complaint popularly is referred to as
the "ad damnum" clause. Vincent v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 75 Conn. 650, 55 A.
177, 179 (1903), rev'd on other grounds, 77 Conn. 281, 58 A. 963 (1904); see SIEGzL § 217.
10 E.g., Sponholz v. Stanislaus, 410 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Michalowski v.
Ey, 7 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 163 N.E.2d 863, 865, 195 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (1959); Litcom Div., Litton
Sys. Inc. v. Suffolk Roofing Co., 52 App. Div. 2d 593, 593-94, 382 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (2d
